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Ι. Reproductive Tourism: the phenomenon, its terminology and semantics 
Crossing borders from one country (the “country of origin”) to another (the “host 
country”), for the purpose of benefiting from medically assisted reproduction services 
(hereinafter “MAR”) is generally referred to in international scientific literature as “cross-
border fertility / procreative / reproductive tourism / travel”1. These terms have at times been 
criticised for being inaccurate as well as for being inappropriate descriptors of the 
phenomenon2. Those scorning the term for being inaccurate maintain that this practice does 
not really qualify as “tourism” since individuals (or couples) seeking to benefit from the use 
of MAR methods and techniques do not travel for entertainment purposes or pleasure. An 
exception to this is sex tourism, which does not qualify as procreative tourism anyway. 
Moreover, those who criticise the term on the grounds of inappropriateness point out that not 
enough emphasis is given to the issues of infertility or the difficulties individuals or couples 
face in gaining access to MAR; they also claim that the public is not aware of the fact that 
such people are compelled to travel / move, precisely as a consequence of such constraints. 
Under the circumstances, such movement is more like “exile” than “tourism”. In the light of 
                                       
* Project study conducted under the Infercit “Excellence” Research Program (coordinated by Prof. Venetia 
Kantsa, at the University of the Aegean) 
1 “Reproductive tourism is the travelling by candidate service recipients from one institution, jurisdiction, or 
country where treatment is not available to another institution, jurisdiction, or country where they can obtain the 
kind of medically assisted reproduction they desire”, see G. Pennings, “Reproductive tourism as moral pluralism 
in motion”, J Med Ethics 2002 (28): 337-341 (p. 337).  
2 On objections  to the terminology adopted, cf. inter alia R. Matorras, ‘‘Reproductive exile versus reproductive 
tourism’’, Oxford Journals 2005: 3751 (p. 3751). 
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such considerations, the term “reproductive tourism” is used in this report to correspond with 
that used in the international literature and in full awareness of the fact that it fails to do 
justice to the phenomenon and fails to reflect its true nature.  
As far as the extent of the phenomenon is concerned, “reproductive tourism” has 
recently assumed vast proportions, a fact also demonstrated by the interest shown in it by 
scientific authors worldwide3. According to various estimates, in European countries alone – 
for which there are reliable statistics4 – some 160 million citizens are refused access to MAR 
methods and techniques that require the use of third-party donated genetic material, as a 
consequence of the prohibition of heterologous fertilization under certain national 
legislations. As a consequence of this, some 80.000 couples are compelled to travel to 
countries other than those in which they habitually reside, in order to benefit from MAR 
services. In Europe alone, reproductive “cycles” attributed to such cross-border movements 
amount to some 24,000 – 30,000 per year.  
The figures are equally impressive when viewed on a global scale: it is estimated that 
some 48.5 million couples around the world –i.e. 15% of the total population of this planet5- 
are facing fertility problems, while 5% of the births worldwide take place with the aid of 
MAR methods and techniques. In other words, some 5 million children have to this day come 
into the world through the aid of MAR6. 
 
II. The causes of “Reproductive Tourism” 
There are many and various reasons why individuals and couples decide to travel 
from their country of origin to another country, in search of MAR services7. The cause as 
well as the motive for such cross-border movement can be found in the legislative (or, in 
                                       
3 Inter alia and only indicatively, cf. S. Bergmann, ‘‘Fertility Tourism: Circumventive Routes That Enable 
Access to Reproductive Technologies and Substances’’, Chicago Journals 2011 (36): 280-289, M. Inhorn / P. 
Patrizio, ‘‘The global landscape of cross-border reproductive care: twenty key findings for the new 
millennium’’, Curr Opin Obstet Gynecol 2012 (24): 158-163, A. Donchin, ‘‘Reproductive Tourism and the 
Quest for Global Gender Justice”, Bioethics 2010 (24): 323-332, A. Ferraretti et al., ‘‘Cross-border 
reproductive care: a phenomenon expressing the controversial aspects of reproductive technologies’’, Reprod. 
BioMed. Online 2010 (20): 261-266, J. Cohen, ‘‘Procreative tourism and reproductive freedom’’, Reprod. 
BioMed. Online 2006 (13): 145-146. 
4 The provision of reliable data is made possible by the existence of a European control mechanism. Cf. a recent 
report by the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE): ‘‘Assisted reproductive 
technology in Europe, 2009: results generated from European registers by ESHRE’’, Hum. Reprod. 2013: 1-14. 
5 Cf. the yearly Surveillance Report by the International Federation of Fertility Societies for 2013. 
6 Since 1978, the year of birth of the first child conceived through in vitro fertilization to this day, according to 
the relevant data providedby ESHRE. Cf. ESHRE’s annual report for 2012. 
7 On this matter, see Feraretti et al., ‘‘Cross-border reproductive care: a phenomenon expressing the 
controversial aspects of reproductive technologies’’, op.cit., p. 262 et seq. and G. Pennings et al., ‘‘ESHRE 
Task Force on Ethics and Law 15: Cross-border reproductive care’’, Hum. Reprod. 2008 (23): 2182-2184. 
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general, the regulatory) framework of each country, which, in respect of the subject that 
concerns us here, can differ so widely from country to country, even amongst countries which 
are geographically or culturally similar. In short, even in the case of European Union Member 
States, it would be quite difficult to find two legal orders that treat the MAR phenomenon in 
the same way, given that different social, ethical and religious perceptions are in principle 
bound to generate different legislations. Moreover, besides legislative restrictions, 
“reproductive tourism” is often caused by religious perceptions (possibly manifest in the form 
of prohibitions reflected in formal ecclesiastical texts as is, for instance, the case of the 
Donum Vitae by the Catholic Church8); equally, it may be due to psychological and/or social 
reasons. More specifically, those interested in embarking on “reproductive tourism” are 
impelled by a variety of motives, which are specified in the following sections.  
 
1. Legislative Constraints 
Legislative restrictions –i.e. prohibitions enshrined in law– constitute the commonest 
reason for persons or couples deciding to resort to “reproductive tourism”. Apart from 
rendering access to MAR practices impossible, such legislative restrictions also provide for 
penal sanctions against those breaching the law. By means of such restrictions, national 
legislations regulate MAR by excluding, sometimes explicitly, sometimes tacitly (i.e. by 
avoiding regulation altogether), specific objects (methods and techniques) or subjects 
meeting specific conditions. More specifically:  
(a) Concerning MAR techniques and methods 
In this category fall those countries whose national legislations provide for an explicit 
and unconditional ban on the use of third-party genetic material within the context of 
heterologous fertilization, a restriction which, as a rule, also includes surrogacy. While the 
restriction on the use of third-party donated genetic material seems to have been relaxed in 
Europe in recent years (a recent example of such relaxation being that of Italy9), the 
prohibition of surrogacy remains to this day the rule, with the exception of only a few 
countries, one of which is Greece. Similarly, the prohibition of pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis, until recently in effect under Italian law, has in practice ceased to be implemented, 
                                       
8 See, inter alia, M. Rodgers Bundren, ‘‘The influence of Catholicism, Islam and Judaism on the Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies (ART). Bioethical and Legal debate: a comparative survey of ART in Italy, Egypt 
and Israel’’, U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 2013 (715): 1-29 (p. 7 et seq.) 
9 In the wake of Ruling No. 162/2014 by the Italian Constitutional Court.  
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particularly in the wake of Italy’s having been found to violate Article 8 ECHR10. As far as 
MAR techniques and methods are concerned, therefore, a kind of “liberalization” may be 
observed in the national legislations of EU Member States, thanks to the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), amongst other things.  
Meanwhile, the debate at the European level has for some time now been focusing on the 
issue of the maintenance of donor anonymity. The principle of anonymity for donors of 
genetic material has been enshrined in the legislation of most European countries. Arguments 
in favour of anonymity mostly refer to the need to preserve the peace of the family, in the 
sense that such peace is safeguarded by excluding (or, at least, limiting) the possibilities of a 
lawsuit being initiated over the issue of paternity recognition , as well as to the need to dispel 
the reservations of potential donors of genetic material, who fear that, at some time in the 
future, they may find themselves faced with an obligation to assume parental duties towards 
one or several of their biological offspring. 
Moreover, those advocating donor anonymity maintain that this regulation is compatible 
with the principle of socio-emotional kinship governing the entire MAR institution11. At the 
other end of the spectrum, those who are in favour of lifting the donor’s anonymity argue that 
a child has the right to be informed of its origins, in the sense of having access to information 
relevant to its biological origins. Amongst other things, this argument seeks justification in 
the fact that children born through use of third-party genetic material will thus be protected 
from the risk of incest or of hereditary health conditions in the future12. In quite a few 
European countries (including Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the Netherlands) there is a 
progressive shift away from the principle of anonymity, with national legislators placing 
themselves on the side of those arguing that it should be possible to reveal the identity of a 
donor. Anonymity of course still remains the rule, albeit with certain variations, as is, for 
instance, the case in Greek law, which allows for the disclosure of medical information to 
                                       
10 Cf. Costa and Pavan v. Italy (Recourse No. 54270/0). Ruling handed down on the 28th August 2012, which is 
analysed  in the following section. 
11 For more on the relevant argumentation, see (inter alia) E. Kounogeri – Manoledaki, ‘‘Υποβοηθούμενη 
αναπαραγωγή με ξένο γεννητικό υλικό - Νομικά και βιοηθικά ζητήματα’’ (Assisted Reproduction through the 
use of third-party genetic material), paper presented at the Conference of the Association for the Study of 
Medical Law and Bioethics, Dec. 11 -13, 2014 – Thessaloniki, also published in the relevant Conference 
Proceedings (p. 1-16) 
12 For arguments a contrario, see (inter alia) Ph. Panagopoulou, “Νομικοηθικές προσεγγίσεις της γνώσεως δότη 
γεννητικού υλικού” (Legal and ethical considerations on the issue of identification of genetic material donors), 
paper presented at the Conference of the Association for the Study of Medical Law and Bioethics, Dec. 11 -13, 
2014 – Thessaloniki, also published in the relevant Conference Proceedings (p. 45-54) 
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children born through MAR13. Another issue, directly related to the question of anonymity, is 
that of the possibility of prospective parents being able to choose a donor. In other words, 
once the law of a given country imposes the rule of anonymity, there can be no question of 
allowing genetic material and/or the donor characteristics to be selected by prospective 
parents, since MAR clinics and cryopreservation banks are under an obligation to preserve 
the secrecy of such data on their records. 
(b)  Concerning the subject of MAR 
Besides prohibitions of specific MAR methods and techniques, national legislations 
also adopt restrictions on access to Medically Assisted Reproduction for reasons relevant to 
marital status, gender, sexual orientation and the age of the subject. 
i.  In respect of marital status 
In most European countries, not only (heterosexual) married couples have access to 
MAR, but also (heterosexual) couples living under a “civil union or registered partnership” 
arrangement, as well as (heterosexual) couples cohabiting in an open relationship. Under the 
circumstances, countries whose legal system generally bans unmarried people from access to 
MAR (for instance, France), appear to be the exception to the rule. 
ii. In respect of gender 
When it comes to access to MAR, most European legislations adopt the principle of 
gender equality. At the other end of the spectrum, there are countries where the legislator -
either explicitly or tacitly has adopted provisions that discriminate against both genders, 
although the discrimination is not justified on the grounds of public interest, such as the need 
to protect f the child to be born or the need to safeguard the dignity of those participating in 
the process of Medically Assisted Reproduction. A typical example is the Greek legislation 
on the subject, which, whilst allowing single women access to surrogacy, remains silent on 
whether single men have the same opportunity, thereby giving rise to the possibility of 
contradictory opinions and even judicial decisions. 
iii. In respect of sexual orientation 
Legislation in various European countries tacitly allows all persons to have access to 
MAR, irrespective of their sexual orientation. In some countries, such as the Scandinavian 
                                       
13 Article 1460 of the Greek Civil Code: “The identity of third parties who have donated their gametes or 
embryos is not disclosed to persons who wish to have a child. Medical information concerning the donor is kept 
confidential, without indication as to [the donor’s] identity. Access to this information is only allowed to the 
child and solely for reasons relating to the said child’s health. The identity of the child and the child’s  parents is 
not disclosed to the donors of gametes or fertilized eggs”. 
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ones, Spain, Belgium and the UK, the law explicitly provides for the right of lesbians14 to 
make use of MAR techniques. In any case, the issue appears to be more pronounced in the 
case of same-sex couples, since the genetic material of one sex is necessarily missing. In this 
particular case, the exclusion of same-sex couples from access to MAR –whether through an 
explicit provision in the law or tacitly, in the absence of an ad hoc provision– constitutes an 
unjustified act of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. This is the case with 
Greek law.  
There is an even more blatant contradiction in those countries where the cohabitation 
(whether under marriage or in the form of a registered partnership) of same-sex couples is 
legally recognised, but such couples are banned from the possibility of having a child through 
MAR.  
This exclusion from access to MAR is only partially offset by the same-sex couple’s 
ability to travel to another country. So, for example, a gay couple may travel to a country 
where single men may use surrogacy (e.g. certain US States) and thus be able to procreate but 
when they return to their home country, they will face the fact that the law will not recognise 
the biological father’s partner as a parent of the child to be born. Similarly, a lesbian couple 
may travel to a country whose legislation allows single women and/ or same-sex couples 
access to MAR; and where donor anonymity may not even be obligatory, which means that it 
would be possible for one of the women to be fertilized with the eggs of her partner. 
However, upon return to the country of their origin, the couple will also face the prohibition 
of joint same-sex parenthood. 
iv. In respect of age 
In many national legislations there are minimum and maximum age limits regarding 
the right of access to MAR. Generally speaking, MAR is primarily intended to serve adults. 
As an exception to this rule, in some countries (e.g. Greece) the law allows minors’ access to 
MAR methods and practices relating to cryopreservation of their genetic material, as long as 
they have been diagnosed for an illness likely to undermine their fertility. 
On the other hand, maximum age limits may be found in some national legislations 
(Greece is here again an example, as well as the Netherlands, both of which have established 
a maximum age limit of 50) just as there are other countries that content themselves with a 
mere, generic reference to the “physical capacity of reproduction” (e.g. France and Spain). It 
                                       
14 On the other hand, the law in those very countries ban homosexual men from access to MAR, on the grounds 
of the law in such countries (with the exception / particular case of the UK) providing for the institution of 
surrogate motherhood. 
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is noteworthy, however, that in most countries, such maximum age limits only apply to 
women. Only in the case of France is there a maximum age limit applying to men. 
 
2. Quality of MAR services 
Just as important a cause of people wishing to procreate taking recourse to 
“reproductive tourism” is the quality of MAR services available in the “host country” 
compared to those available in the “country of origin”, combined with such factors as 
geographical proximity/accessibility (i.e. the distance factor) and the length of waiting time 
(e.g. waiting lists applying in State clinics) associated with the availability of the relevant 
services. More often than not, the quality of services provided is also associated with yet 
another parameter, namely that of previous abortive attempts/failed pregnancies. As a matter 
of fact, there are countries, both within and outside Europe, that possess an exceptionally 
well-developed network of MAR services, both in terms of applicable methods and 
techniques and in terms of their accessibility to  those interested in  such services, sometimes 
even over the Internet. Typical examples of European States providing high quality MAR 
services in combination with easy access – whether through private clinics or/and through the 
national health care system – are those of Greece and Spain, whereas the US, Russia and 
India have become the biggest MAR “markets” worldwide. In any case, these two factors 
(namely, the quality of MAR and the ease of access to them) do not necessarily concur, since 
ease of access (for instance, the possibility of ordering genetic material and/or of choosing  a 
surrogate mother over the phone or the Internet) might be associated with a lack of State 
control, a factor eventually affecting the quality of services provided, thus increasing the risk 
of exploitation of those involved as well as of an eventual commercialisation of the procedure 
as a whole. 
 
3. Cost of the “cycle” 
Relevant to the quality of MAR services, as well as to the access to them, is the cost 
of the reproduction “cycle” in each country. Comparative data collected by competent 
organisations in Europe as well as internationally15 have come to prove that MAR services 
are provided at a lower cost in countries outside Europe (mostly in India). Even within 
Europe, however, there are considerable differences in this respect even amongst EU Member 
States, given that the less wealthy of these States (particularly those which formerly belonged 
                                       
15 According to recent reports by ESHRE and IFFS. 
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to the so-called “East-European Block”) have come to be “host countries” for MAR services. 
On the other hand, we have a paradoxical situation in which MAR services appear to be 
provided at a lower cost in such countries – always in comparison with the rest of the 
European countries – although these lower costs remain prohibitive for the nationals of these 
countries, which means that the latter are practically barred from access to MAR16 in their 
own country. Admittedly, however, Greece has as of late come to feature amongst the 
popular destinations of “reproductive tourism”, thanks to its tolerant legislation in this field, 
as well as to the fact that part of the cost of the “cycles” is absorbed by the national health 
system, provided the participants are citizens of an EU Member State, according to the 
relevant provisions in EU legislation, to be discussed below (Section III). 
 
4. Social and/or Psychological Reasons 
A final set of reasons are those referred to as “social and/or psychological ones”, since 
many individuals set out for another country in an effort to prevent  their social milieu or 
professional environment from finding out that they are about to take recourse to MAR 
methods and techniques. A couple’s concern about their  neighbours’ and relatives’ reactions 
(“what will people say or think?”) should it be revealed that they are  facing fertility issues is 
a matter of great importance, mostly in countries outside Europe (particularly Muslim 
countries, since in such societies the use of third-party genetic material is equivalent to 
adultery)17. Still, what apparently remains a “taboo” at the European level is the involvement  
of another woman (the surrogate) in the process, a fact reflected in the prohibition of 
surrogacy in almost all European States except Greece. 
To sum up, it may be seen that in addition to an initial medical inability to reproduce 
(medical infertility), there may also, as a consequence, be an inability of a social kind (social 
infertility), produced by all the factors that constitute the causes of “reproductive tourism”.  
 
III. “Reproductive Tourism” within the European Union 
As far as the EU Member States are concerned, not only is it impossible to prohibit  
reproductive tourism but in fact such tourism is reinforced by the structure and aims of  the 
European Union, as these are expressed in both the primary and secondary legislation of the 
latter. More specifically, as far as European primary law is concerned, Articles 45 et seq. of 
                                       
16 On this issue see, amongst others, R. Storrow, “Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and 
Feminist Legal Theory”. Hastings Law Journal 2005 (57): 295-330 (pp. 327-328).  
17 See M. Aboulghar, ‘‘Ethical aspects and regulation of assisted reproduction in the Arabic-speaking world’’. 
Reprod. Biomed. Online 2007 (14): 143-146. 
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the TFUE on freedom of establishment, as well as Articles 49 et seq. of the TFUE on the 
freedom to provide services18, prohibit the preservation or institution of constraints on the 
freedom of movement, as well as instituting the right of EU citizens to have access to 
economic activities throughout EU territory. Consequently, as far as the citizens of the 
European Union are concerned, there may be no question of a prohibition on travel for the 
purpose of having access to MAR services, precisely because of the existence of a unified EU 
territory in which citizens may move and establish themselves freely, and may provide or 
receive services without hindrance. Such services may include health-related ones (including 
but not limited to MAR services), which belong to the domain of “economic activities”. 
This general precept of the Treaty has been supplemented by a multitude of more 
specific EU Regulations and Directives19. Directive 2011/24/EC issued in 2011 on the 
freedom of movement of “patients”, a term understood to also include those aspiring to or 
benefiting from MAR services, for whom there is a provision for a right to compensation, 
which, however, is limited to the amount provided for in the country of origin. Also of 
relevance is Directive 2004/23/EC20 on the “transportation of human cells and tissue”, which 
deals with similar, though not identical issues, to those associated with MAR. Even so, this 
last Directive has prompted those States not possessing ad hoc MAR legislation to 
harmonize, by instituting the relevant provisions. Thus, there are States where MAR-related 
legislation has come to be passed in conformity with the terms of the said Directive, whereas 
in other States, MAR legislation had already been in place before the adoption of the said 
provisions at the EU level. A recent Directive (2012/25/EC) on transplantations21 is also 
relevant . 
Together with the adoption of secondary law by the competent institutions at EU 
level, the Court of Justice of the European Union has lost no opportunity to stress  the fact 
that citizens of the various EU Member States are entitled to move throughout EU territory 
and benefit from health services, either because a particular treatment is still at the 
experimental stage and therefore not available in a particular Member State22 or because a 
                                       
18 Cf. Chapter (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE). 
19 Cf. Regulation 1406/71/EC, as well as Ruling Nos. 120/95 and 158/96 by the Court of Justice in the cases 
Kohll and Deckercases, ibidem.  
20 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on “establishing quality and safety standards 
governing the donation, supply, control, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissue and 
cells”, transposed into Hellenic national law by virtue of Presidential Decree 26/2008. 
21 Directive of the European Commission of the 9th October 2012 on procedures for the notification of the 
exchange, amongst Member States, of human organs destined for transplantation, transposed into Hellenic 
national law by virtue of Law 4272/2014. 
22 CJEU, 12.7.2001, Case 157/99, Peerbooms, Jurisprudence 2001, p. Ι-5473.  
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treatment is not yet available in one Member State but may be readily available23 in the 
territory of another Member State, or because a particular treatment may be provided in the 
territory of the host Member State at a lower cost24 or even under more favourable conditions 
than in the Member State of origin25. 
From the above arises the question of to what extent a social right to reproduction 
through MAR methods and techniques may be claimed to have been instituted at EU level. 
The answer to this question is probably negative, at least as far as the current state of EU law 
is concerned, in the sense that no claim by interested parties to financially safeguarded access 
to MAR methods and techniques is recognised at EU level26. What, however, is recognised 
on the basis of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice is the economic right of EU 
citizens to travel to Member States other than their state of origin in order to benefit  from 
health services (including services related to MAR) under more favourable terms and 
conditions and probably at a lower cost than those existing in the State in which they reside , 
given the fact that no obstacles may be imposed either on the freedom of movement or on the 
provision of cross-border economic services27. 
The answer to the question of to what extent a right to reproduction through MAR 
methods and techniques has been established at the EU level would nevertheless be different 
from the perspective of the Council of Europe, on the basis of  the European Convention of 
Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR). As a matter of fact, a right of this nature could indeed be 
justified by reference to the terms of Article 8 of ECHR on the protection of private and 
family life28. There are indeed several rulings handed down by the European Court of Human 
Rights endorsing, albeit quite discreetly, the view of a right to reproduction by MAR methods 
and techniques. More specifically:  
In the case of Evans v. the United Kingdom29, the Court held that the terms of Article 
8 of the ECHR are understood to also include the right to decide whether to procreate through 
                                       
23 CJEU 28.4.1998, Case 158/96, Raymond Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie, Jurisprudence 1998, p. Ι-
1931 and CJEU 13.5.2003, Case 385/99, Müller-Fauré and Van Riet, Jurisprudence 2003, p. Ι-4509.  
24 CJEU, 12.07.2001, Case 368/98, Vanbraekel ea., Jurisprudence 2001, p. I-5363. 
25 CJEU, 13.05.2003, Case 385/99, Müller – Fauré, op.cit. 
26 Cf. a recent ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union whereby the Court rejected a request for 
extension of maternity leave of a working woman who had had a child through surrogate motherhood: CJEU 
18.03.2014, Case 167/12, CD vs. S.T. , not published in the Court’s Jurisprudence. 
27 Moreover, Articles (7) and (9) of the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights read as follows: Article (7) 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications”; Article (9): 
“The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws 
governing the exercise of these rights”. 
28 Article (8) of the ECHR: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence”. 
29 Ruling handed down on the 10th April 2007 (Referral no. 6339/05). 
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the use of  MAR or not. The Court chose to maintain the same stance in its ruling in the case 
of Dickson v. the United Kingdom30, in which the Court held that the right of an individual to 
have a child by means of MAR methods and through use of one’s own genetic material, falls 
within the scope of the protection of one’s private and family life (Article 8 par. 1 of ECHR). 
In the well-known case of S.H. and others v. Austria31, two Austrian couples brought 
a case before the Court in which they protested about what they saw as an undue restriction 
on their right to private and family life, resulting from a ban on heterologous fertilization 
under Austrian law. The European Court of Human Rights held that such a ban under 
Austrian law did not violate the terms of Article 8 of the ECHR since – so the Court reasoned 
– in the absence of a general consensus amongst contracting States of the Convention as to 
the use of third-party genetic material, the Austrian legislator rightly had a wide margin of 
appreciation (marge d’appréciation) in evaluating the case and could therefore opt whether to 
adopt such a ban or not, given that such a ban was in effect at the time that the particular 
referral was pending before the ECHR, as well as being debated in several other countries, 
besides Austria. Interestingly, the ruling handed down by the Court in this particular case 
there was a minority of four members who accepted the appellants’ claim that the ban under 
Austrian law constituted a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR, in that it unduly limited the 
right of the parties concerned to procreate by means of MAR and more specifically by taking 
recourse to heterologous fertilization (prohibited under Austrian law). In this particular case, 
the right in question was a purely individual right as there was no question of the state 
covering the cost that the parties concerned would have incurred; rather, the right concerned 
the freedom of access to MAR methods. 
In the case of Costa and Pavan v. Italy32, an Italian couple took recourse to the 
ECHR, claiming that the ban applying under Italian law with respect to PGD (pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis) was placing the life of their future child at risk besides 
placing themselves, the parents, under acute emotional stress (on top of the mother’s physical 
strain), since both parents in that case had been diagnosed as carriers of the cystic fibrosis 
gene, something they, understandably, had no wish to pass down to the foetus. The European 
Court of Human Rights upheld the appellants’ claim, ruling that the ban under Italian law was 
inconsistent/incoherent, in the sense that whilst it prohibited pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis of the fertilized egg – thereby obliging the mother-to-be to carry a foetus with 
                                       
30 Ruling handed down on the 4th December 2007 (Referral no. 44362/04). 
31 Ruling handed down on the 3d November 2011 (Referral no. 57813/00). 
32 Ruling handed down on the 28th August 2012 (Referral no. 54270/10). 
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health problems – it still allowed the pregnancy to be terminated on medical grounds, namely 
if during the pregnancy it was determined that the foetus was suffering from a certain 
condition. Besides, the “margin of appreciation” (marge d’appréciation) that the legislator 
had in instituting such a ban had to be considered in the light of the circumstances prevailing 
in other countries of the Convention, as far as the level of consensus amongst them was 
concerned. At the time the European Court of Human Rights was deliberating on the case, 
apart from Italy, none of the other 32 contracting States, except for Austria and Switzerland, 
provided for such bans, while in the meantime Switzerland had already taken the necessary 
steps to change its relevant legislation.   
Last but not least, in the recent cases of Menneson v. France and Labasse v. France33, 
two heterosexual French couples travelled to the US and had babies through surrogate 
mothers who had in both cases been inseminated with the husbands’ sperm of the respective 
couples. In the US, the said French couples were legally recognised as the legitimate parents 
of the babies born through surrogacy. However, when they attempted to gain similar 
recognition t in France, the French authorities declined to have their babies registered as such, 
on the grounds that it violated the ban on  surrogacy applying under  French law. Both cases  
eventually ended up before the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled  that the ban 
on surrogacy applying under French law did not constitute a violation of the terms of Article 
8 of the ECHR, with regard to the right of  parents to acquire children by this particular 
method; on the other hand, the refusal of the French Authorities to register the children after 
they had been born, constituted  a violation of the said Article (i.e. Article 8 of ECHR) with 
respect to the children’s private lives. 
In summing up, whereas it appears that a right to reproduction by MAR methods and 
techniques cannot in all cases be inferred from the terms of Article 8 of the ECHR, certain 
bans applying under the national laws of contracting States with respect to those entitled to 
MAR or the permitted techniques and methods  may ultimately conflict with the right  private 
and family life consolidated under the Convention. A key criterion is consensus, or rather the 
tendency developing among the members of the Council of Europe, which determines a 
wider or narrower margin of discretion, which the Court gives to the contracting states that 
diverge from that tendency.  
 
IV. The repercussions of “reproductive tourism” on the economy and society 
                                       
33 Ruling handed down on the 26th June 2014 (Referrals Nos. 65192/11 and 65941/11, respectively). 
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Reproductive tourism is a phenomenon that has repercussions both on the law itself 
and on the economy and society as a whole. Besides the criminal liabilities that the receipt of 
MAR services in one country is likely to incur in another country when these services are 
expressly prohibited by the legislation of the latter country, a multitude of civil and 
international private law issues arise with respect to nationality, kinship and inheritance, 
especially in the case of the use of third-party genetic material and most particularly in the 
case of surrogacy. Thus, a child born through the use of MAR runs the risk of ending up 
parentless (i.e. without legally recognised parents) as well as stateless, in those cases where 
the legal ban on particular MAR methods and techniques is accompanied by a negative 
attitude on the part of the national administrative authorities and/of the national courts 
towards a  regulation, albeit a posteriori (i.e. after  the child’s birth) of the actual situation 
that has come into existence. . 
On the other hand, so long as the reasons motivating people to cross borders in order 
to procreate persist, there will really be no means of preventing such movements. However 
explicit, no legal restrictions could really suffice, given that people embarking on 
“reproductive tourism”, will find ways of “getting round”, rather than violating the laws of 
their country of origin. Especially in the case of Member States of the European Union, 
cross-border travels within EU territory, no restrictions on “reproductive tourism” could ever 
really be imposed, since such restrictions would be tantamount to placing restrictions on  the 
freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide services. 
Considered from an economic perspective, cross-border movements within the EU 
(where a related  obligation to cover costs incurred in the use of  MAR services) constitute a 
burden on those states that essentially function as “host countries”, as the national health 
systems of such states are called upon to pay the MAR-related expenses incurred by citizens 
of other Member States. The problem becomes even greater in the case of poorer states where 
national health care services are provided at a lower cost (this being obviously the case in 
Greece) and which are, as a consequence, more attractive in respect of the provision of health 
care services in general and of MAR services in particular. 
Last but not least, even from a societal perspective, one cannot afford to disregard the 
fact that “reproductive tourism” functions as a “safety valve”, providing conservative national 
legislators with an alibi. What it also does, however, is to preserve (if not at times exacerbate) 
existing economic inequalities amongst Member States, with citizens still being unable to 
gain access to MAR services and techniques whilst citizens from other financially stronger 
states, in search of such services, help to keep prices in a certain “black market”, whether 
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within Europe (e.g. Bulgaria) or beyond (e.g. India), at a high level. Impossible though it is to 
handle this issue outside the EU, it is more than obvious that the problem must and should be 
tackled through harmonising the legal systems of different countries, at least within the 
territory of the European Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
